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Abstract – This paper presents a simple but powerful Real 
Options Valuation methodology suitable for valuing 
flexibility in complex engineered systems. It is based on 
value-at-risk analysis and relies on a standard discounted 
cash flow approach. A case study on the architecting of 
flexible satellite fleets is presented. The architecting 
framework integrates spacecraft engineering design with 
economic analysis for the purpose of maximizing the 
financial value of a fleet to the operator under uncertain, 
evolving market conditions. The investigation considers 
the forecasted demand evolution for a satellite service in 
two distant geographical markets simultaneously and 
provides flexible fleet architectures that significantly 
improve various aspects of the value-at-risk distributions 
compared to those of a traditional, rigid fleet architecture. 
It is shown that the flexible architectures are able to 
capture more revenue, mitigate more risk and/or reduce 
overall required investment. The suggested Real Options 
“in” the system, rather than “on” the system, approach 
allows engineers, strategists, or decision makers in 
engineering establishments to embed flexibility in the 
design of complex systems for the purpose of maximizing 
their total lifetime value. 
Keywords: Real Options, Flexibility, Spacecraft Design, 
Fleet Architecture, Genetic Algorithm. 
1 Introduction 
 The topic of “designing for flexibility in engineering 
systems” is of much interest at the Engineering Systems 
Division at MIT. In financial markets, options and 
derivatives on securities have been adopted as proven 
mechanisms of coping with uncertainty [1]. A financial 
option gives its owner the right, but not the obligation, to 
take a particular course of action in the future, thus 
provides flexibility in the decision making process with the 
objective of limiting downside losses while capitalizing on 
upside potential opportunities. Building on financial 
options valuation approaches, Real Options Valuation 
(ROV) has been emerging in the past few years as a set of 
tools, or perhaps a discipline, that applies ideas from 
quantitative finance to engineering projects. Real Options 
analysis is used in strategic planning to cope with 
uncertainty in engineering projects by embedding 
flexibility and allowing for adaptive and staged 
deployment.  
 This paper presents a transparent ROV approach that 
is appropriate for engineering applications and use by 
engineers that are interested in embedding flexibility in the 
technical design of systems for which the assumptions 
behind sophisticated and exotic financial options valuation 
approaches are invalid. Additionally, the suggested 
approach allows direct comparison between flexible and 
rigid architectures or system configurations. This value-at-
risk analysis-based ROV approach was formulated by de 
Neufville et al [2] in an effort to propagate systems 
thinking and flexibility in engineering design.  
 This approach is called “Real Options in Systems” to 
indicate that the approach encourages engineers to explore 
technical flexibility levers that maximize systems’ value as 
opposed to performing Real Options analysis on the system 
without investigating how to design for flexibility in 
engineered systems. The value-at-risk ROV approach is 
described through an application to a case study involving 
the architecting of flexible satellite fleets and comparing 
them to a rigid baseline architecture. 
2 Case Study: Satellite Fleet Design  
 This investigation applies value-at-risk analysis to 
rigid and flexible designs for a satellite fleet. It 
demonstrates how the analysis both quantifies the value of 
flexibility and demonstrates how flexible designs manage 
uncertainty by shifting the distribution of possible 
outcomes to the right and, most specifically, by slashing 
the range of possible losses. 
 Like many complex systems, commercial 
communication satellites are designed for long lifetimes; in 
this case, 15 or more years of service. It is difficult to 
forecast accurately the demand for satellite services. Thus 
it is also difficult to identify properly a satellite’s optimal 
set of design requirements in terms of geographical 
coverage, service type and required traffic capacity over 
this long operational lifetime in order to maximize its 
profitability. Identification of design requirements is even 
more problematic because of the evolutionary nature of the 
demand, i.e. that demand is a function of time and could 
change rather than remain constant over a satellite lifetime 
because of demographics, competition from terrestrial 
services, political, economic or other factors.  
 When a satellite system is designed to satisfy a rigid 
set of requirements, i.e. provide a certain service type with 
a specific bandwidth capacity and geographical coverage, 
the operator risks large losses if the market the satellite 
system is designed to serve does not emerge as forecast. On 
the other hand, if the market under consideration indeed 
materializes but, for example, ends up requiring more 
capacity than anticipated, the operator might not be able to 
capture this additional revenue. Furthermore, when a 
market is dynamic, i.e. changes over time, ambiguity is 
encountered in requirement specification as related to the 
appropriate mix of services and their associated capacity 
and coverage.  
 A central question is how to embed architectural 
flexibility in a communication satellite fleet such that the 
expected economic value is maximized. In engineering 
projects, flexibility could be built in via a staged 
deployment approach; i.e., an architecture could be 
configured into multiple stages that are built and brought to 
service over time based on market development. Using 
staged deployment to design for flexibility in individual 
commercial communication Geosynchronous spacecraft 
means that the spacecraft design itself has to be altered 
over its lifetime to adapt to emerging market conditions. 
This is especially hard because commercial communication 
satellites are typically inaccessible after launch.  
 One solution to provide flexibility is by on-orbit 
servicing.  Researchers [3] have investigated the feasibility 
of various concepts of doing this. It remains to be seen 
whether this proves to be economically feasible. Moreover, 
in order for on-orbit servicing to materialize, some 
technical challenges must be overcome first, which perhaps 
classify on-orbit servicing as a possible future solution. 
 In contrast, the objective of the research presented in 
this paper is to embed flexibility in the design of 
commercial communication satellites using “current 
technology”, assuming the unavailability of any kind of on-
orbit servicing. This approach provides solutions that could 
be implemented in the design of today’s commercial 
communication satellite systems. Hassan et al [4, 5] 
provide more information on the detailed technical 
implementation of this approach. 
 The analysis presented in this paper assumes that the 
impact of design flexibility, which is provided on the 
spacecraft level, is valued on the fleet level in a system-of-
systems (SoS) context. That is, the ability of the spacecraft 
to provide different and/or similar communication services 
to multiple disconnected geographical markets at different 
stages during its lifetime provides flexibility on the 
operational level of a fleet such that losses could be 
minimized and revenue could be maximized. In that sense, 
the framework presented in this paper couples vehicle-
centric design and operations-centric (fleet) architecting. 
3 Demand Dynamic Uncertainty 
 The sample case study considers the demand 
evolution for a single satellite service in two 
geographically disconnected regions. This is a Ku-band 
fixed satellite service. The two regional markets under 
consideration have coverage area requirements of 40 and 
52 deg2 as viewed from Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 
(GEO). These coverages define regions with areas similar 
to those of Continental Europe and Latin America.  These 
areas will be referred to as: Coverage Area I (CA-I) and 
Coverage Area II (CA-II) respectively. The analysis 
assumes that the two coverage areas are disconnected and 
are sufficiently distant that they could only be served from 
different orbital locations.  
 The demand in the two regions is assumed to follow 
the discrete distributions described in Figure 1. A 20 year 
timeline is considered for the demand distributions and is 
divided into four five-year stages: the first stage spans year 
1 (Y1) to year 5 (Y5); the second stage spans year 6 (Y6) 
to year 7 (Y7), and so on. The demand in each region or 
coverage area is assumed to have five discrete possibilities 
that are referred to as scenarios 1, 2, … 5 ( 1S , 2S , … 5S ).  
The analysis assumes that there is no cross-strapping 
between the scenarios across the four stages.  
 Figure 1 shows that the transponder demand is 
decreasing in CA-I over a period of 20 years while the 
demand in CA-II is increasing. There are 25 possible 
scenario combinations of transponder demand levels in the 
two markets or coverage areas under consideration.  
4 Fleet Architecting Framework 
 The fleet architecting framework is meant to tackle 
strategic planning problems as exemplified in the 
challenges presented in the demand evolution section. In its 
current version, this framework is intended to answer
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Figure 1. Forecast transponder demand distributions for a fixed satellite service in two hypothetical markets over 20 years 
questions related to the number of satellites in a fleet, 
satellite payload design as related to demand models, and 
amount of required payload flexibility. The main building 
blocks this framework are schematically depicted in Figure 
2. The framework is organized to couple economic and 
technical domains. The economic domain houses the 
forecasted market demand models for satellite services, 
which are uncertain and dynamic, and the ROV model, 
which probabilistically evaluates the Net Present Value 
(NPV) of a fleet and constructs the value-at-risk 
cumulative density function of an architecture. The 
technical domain houses the spacecraft (S/C) sizing and 
reliability models that are coupled with a Genetic 
Algorithm (GA), a heuristic optimization approach based 
on Darwin’s Theory of Natural Selection, to find optimal 
spacecraft designs. 
  
Figure 2. Satellite fleet architecting framework 
4.1 Step I: Fleet Architecting Using Demand Models 
 Fleet architecting starts and ends in the economic 
domain and constitutes an iterative process between the 
economic and technical domains. A single iteration starts 
by investigating the demand models for satellite services 
over a number of potential geographical markets. A fleet 
architecture is then generated to satisfy parts of or all the 
demand predicted in the different geographical markets 
under consideration. Four operational parameters related to 
the fleet architecture are decided upon at this stage of the 
design process and are passed to the next stage of the 
analysis. The four parameters are: the number of coverage 
areas (geographical markets) that the fleet is going to serve, 
the mix of services the fleet will provide in each coverage 
area, the number of spacecraft in the fleet, and the 
allocation of each spacecraft to serve one or more coverage 
areas. Those parameters are determined for each stage.  
 The determination of the four fleet parameters maps 
the multistage operational strategy of the fleet and lays 
down the payload requirements for each spacecraft in the 
fleet. Spacecraft payload requirements may or may not 
include operational level flexibility requirements. For 
example, a rigid fleet architecture could correspond to two 
spacecraft, each of which is designed to exclusively serve 
one of the two independent coverage areas during all four 
stages in the 20-year time. On the other hand, a flexible 
fleet architecture may include a single spacecraft that 
incorporates payload capabilities (antenna size and 
transponder design) to serve CA-I or CA-II at different 
stages in the 20-year time span depending on demand 
materialization. The flexible spacecraft must also have the 
capability of moving itself to another orbital location when 
switching coverage areas.  
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4.2 Step II: Spacecraft Design 
 The payload design requirements for each spacecraft 
in the fleet are passed from the economic to the technical 
domain. In the technical domain, the GA is coupled with 
the spacecraft sizing and reliability estimation models to 
find optimal spacecraft designs that satisfy the given 
payload requirements. The GA generates spacecraft 
designs with optimal combinations of technology choices 
and redundancy levels that minimize spacecraft launch 
mass (surrogate for cost) and satisfy reliability constraints. 
4.3 Step III: Revenue Estimation 
 After the technical domain generates optimal, feasible 
designs for the spacecraft systems in a given fleet 
architecture, the ROV module probabilistically evaluates 
revenue and cost, hence its net present value. Revenue 
estimation requires two inputs: the forecasted, uncertain, 
dynamic demand models similar to the distributions in 
Figure 1, and the payload design parameters of the 
spacecraft in the fleet, including the number of available 
transponders designated to each service type and all the 
coverage areas those transponders are designed to serve at 
any stage in the 20-year time span.  
4.4 Step IV: Cost Estimation 
 The last step in an iteration in the fleet architecting 
framework is the cost estimation of the generated fleet 
architecture. The cost of a fleet is divided into spacecraft 
acquisition, launch, insurance and operating costs. The 
spacecraft cost is determined by the spacecraft payload 
design and the bus design, which is information passed 
onto the ROV model from the technical domain. For the 
same number of available transponders, a flexible 
spacecraft (one that could serve multiple coverage areas at 
different stages or provide multiple services) is more 
expensive than a rigid spacecraft. The launch cost is 
determined mainly based on the total wet mass of the 
spacecraft in the fleet, which again is information passed 
onto the ROV model from the technical domain. Finally, 
the operating cost is a function of the size of the spacecraft, 
but also varies with the operational strategy. The operating 
cost increases when two spacecraft are co-located in the 
same orbital position. For example, the operating cost of a 
60 transponder spacecraft system is less than that of two 30 
transponder spacecraft systems that are co-located in the 
same orbital position to serve a single coverage area. 
5 System Architectures 
 The framework described in Figure 2 was employed 
to generate a rigid and three flexible fleet architectures 
along with their associated optimal spacecraft designs as 
solutions meeting the requirements in Figure 1. The rigid 
architecture includes two spacecraft; each is dedicated to 
serve only one of the coverage areas for 15 years. The CA-
I spacecraft  provides services in the first, second, and third 
stages. This spacecraft has 60 active transponders, which is 
the average transponder demand in the first stage (forecast 
peak). The CA-II spacecraft  provides services in the 
second, third, and fourth stages. This spacecraft has 60 
active transponders, which is the average transponder 
demand in the fourth stage (forecast peak ).  
 The three flexible fleets have different architectural 
configurations and use combinations of four levers to 
embed architectural flexibility. The first lever is the 
payload flexibility switch that allows a spacecraft to serve 
either of the two coverage areas. The second and third fleet 
levers are the number of spacecraft in a fleet and the 
payload size in each spacecraft. Finally, the fourth lever is 
the timing or relative sequencing of spacecraft deployment. 
Table 1 summarizes the architectural configurations. Note 
that flexible fleets II and III have the same configuration 
except that the second spacecraft in flexible fleet II is 
deployed at the beginning of the first stage while in flexible 
fleet III, it is deployed at the beginning of the second stage.  
 The GA, coupled with the spacecraft technical 
models, found optimal designs for each of the spacecraft in 
the four fleet architectures. Table 2 compares selected 
spacecraft design parameters that the GA produced are and 
demonstrates the effect of change in payload requirements 
on the optimal design of the spacecraft.  
 Two facets of Table 2 are worth highlighting. First, in 
the rigid fleet architecture, although S/C I and S/C II have 
the same transponder design, the mass of S/C II is larger 
because CA-II is 12 deg2 larger than CA-I. It thus requires 
a larger antenna to provide full coverage, which increases 
the structural mass of the spacecraft. Second, the single 
flexible S/C in flexible fleet I also has the same number of 
active transponders as S/C I and S/C II in the rigid fleet 
architecture. However, the flexibility requirements in the 
transponder design adds the mass of extra pairs of 
frequency filters for each transponder and decreases the 
HPA efficiency. This increases payload power 
requirements that in turn require more capabilities from the 
bus subsystems as shown in the design of the solar array, 
batteries and thermal radiator in Table 2. 
6 Value-at-Risk Analysis 
 A value-at-risk (VaR) analyses display the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of the possible outcomes of a 
design. The VaR itself is the minimum loss that might exist 
at any probability. A comparison of the VaR curves of two 
architectures or design solutions shows the differences both 
in maximum possible loss and gain between them.
Table 1. Architectural configuration of fleet solutions 
Architectural Parameters Rigid Fleet Flexible Fleet I Flexible Fleet II Flexible Fleet III 
Number of spacecraft 2 1 2 2 
Active transponders S/C I in CA-I: 60 S/C II in CA-II: 60 60 
S/C I: 30 
S/C II: 30 
S/C I: 30 
S/C II: 30 
Payload flexibility none yes both yes both yes 
Deployment stage S/C I in CA-I: stage I S/C II in CA-II: stage II stage I 
S/C I: stage I 
S/C II: stage I 
S/C I: stage I 
 S/C II: stage II 
 
Table 2. Selected parameters of optimal spacecraft designs for the fleet architectures in Table 1 
 Rigid Fleet Flexible Fleet I Flexible Fleet II Flexible Fleet III 
Optimized Design Parameter S/C I in CA-I 
S/C II in 
CA-II 
Flexible 
S/C 
Flexible 
S/C I 
Flexible 
S/C II 
Flexible 
S/C I 
Flexible 
S/C II 
Total Launch Mass (kg) 4,541 4,888 5,962 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 
Payload        
Active HPAs* 60 60 60 30 30 30 30 
Available HPAs 72 72 72 36 36 36 36 
HPA efficiency (%) 58 58 55 55 55 55 55 
Payload Power (W) 6,960 6,960 7,326 3,663 3,663 3,663 3,663 
Bus        
Solar Array Area (m2) 69.7 69.7 73.3 36.7 36.7 36.7 36.7 
Battery Mass (kg) 240 240 338 127 127 127 127 
Radiator Area (m2) 9.9 9.9 10.7 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
 *HPA: High Power Amplifier, S/C: Spacecraft, CA: Coverage Area 
  VaR calculations also lead to valuation of the 
flexibility provided by the different architectures. This is 
the difference between the expected net present value, 
E(NPV), of a flexible and a rigid design as shown in 
Equation 1. 
     ( ) ( )rigidflexible NPVENPVEvaluelexibilityf −=   (1) 
 The E(NPV) themselves can be calculated from 
present values of the revenues and costs of any design, as 
provided by the revenue and cost estimation models of the 
fleet architecting framework. For the purpose of the 
graphical comparison of the NPV distributions of the 
flexible fleet architectures against that of the rigid 
architecture, continuous approximations of the discrete 
CDF’s of the four fleet architectures were implemented.  
 Figure 3 and Table 3 summarize the VaR analysis of 
the four fleet architectures. The next four subsections 
analyze these results in detail. 
6.1 Valuation of the Rigid Fleet Architecture 
 The rigid architecture is representative of a traditional 
fleet design approach where demand evolution and 
uncertainties are ignored and payload requirements are 
determined based on forecast peak demand. This rigid fleet 
architecture cannot respond to changes in market demand. 
On the other hand, it offers the best possible use of 
spacecraft resources from a narrow technical perspective. 
For example, the HPA can be operated at a maximum 
efficiency of 58%, which minimizes payload power 
requirements. This usually leads to lighter, less expensive 
spacecraft systems. Note, however, that the objective of 
designing the spacecraft is not to maximize technical 
performance but overall economic efficiency. 
 The mean of the distribution in Figure 3 is equivalent 
to the E(NPV). For this rigid architecture, E(NPV) is $ 
49.94 million with a standard deviation is $ 3.69 million. It 
should be noted that the probabilistic analysis used to value 
the NPV distributions provides a realistic estimate of the 
fleet value by accounting for the uncertainties associated 
with the evolution of the market demand. Deterministic 
NPV calculations would have led strategists to 
overestimate the value of the rigid fleet architecture. This is 
because, in a deterministic approach, the demand is 
assumed to stay constant at the payload size that the 
spacecraft in the fleet is designed to support. In the rigid 
fleet architecture and in a deterministic NPV calculation 
approach, the demand would be assumed to stay constant at 
60 transponders in each of the coverage areas over the life 
of the system. This invalid and unrealistic assumption leads 
to an NPV value of $ 73.21 million, a $ 23.27 million 
overestimate of the true value. This calculation shows that 
probabilistic analysis should always be implemented to 
realistically estimate the value of a project.          
                                                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Value-at-risk distributions (cumulative density functions) for the four satellite fleet architectures 
Table 3. Comparison of economic values of the four satellite fleet architectures  
Architectural Value 
Parameter ($ million) Rigid Fleet Flexible Fleet I Flexible Fleet II Flexible Fleet III 
E(NPV) 49.94 95.81 56.20 19.40 
Std(NPV) 3.69 4.63 3.74 1.63 
Flexibility Value - 45.86 6.26 -30.55 
Fixed cost, pay year 1 242 275 341 170 
Fixed cost, pay year 6 242 - - 170 
PV(fixed cost) at year 1 392 275 341 276 
Maximum possible gain 192 193 142 73 
Maximum possible loss 162 68 131 86 
 
 As Figure 3 shows, The VaR provides decision 
makers with an idea about the maximum possible losses or 
gains their project could realize. For the rigid fleet 
architecture, the maximum possible loss is $ 162 million 
and the maximum possible profit is $ 192 million. 
 An important piece of information for the decision 
making process that can be obtained from the cost analysis 
is the initial capital investment required for a fleet 
architecture. A general good investment strategy is to 
choose projects with lowest initial investments to minimize 
the possibility of early losses. In the space industry, this 
strategy is hard to achieve because most of the fixed cost of 
a fleet, including spacecraft acquisition, launch and 
insurance, must be invested before generating any revenue 
from the fleet’s services. The initial capital investment can 
be used to compare the value of flexible fleet architectures 
against that of the rigid fleet architecture. For the rigid fleet 
architecture, the initial capital investment is $ 242 million, 
which includes the cost of acquiring, launching and 
insuring S/C I that serves CA-I. At the beginning of the 
second stage, an additional $ 242 million must be paid to 
acquire, launch and insure S/C II that serves CA-II. Using 
a yearly discount rate of 10% and ignoring inflation, the 
present value of the total fixed cost invested in the rigid 
architecture is estimated as $ 392 million. 
6.2 Valuation of the Flexible Fleet Architecture I 
 Flexible fleet architecture I comprises a single large 
flexible spacecraft with 60 active transponders and can 
serve either coverage area at a time. This single spacecraft 
fleet configuration is inspired by the fact that a major cost 
element in the fixed cost of a satellite system is the launch 
cost. Therefore, it is intuitive to think that the fewer the 
launches, the less costly the fleet, and the larger financial 
fleet value. Figure 3 shows that the E(NPV) of flexible 
fleet architecture I is $ 95.81 million (compared to $ 49.94 
million for the rigid architecture) with a standard deviation 
of $ 4.36 million (compared to $ 3.96 million for the rigid 
architecture). The maximum possible loss and gain for 
flexible fleet architecture I is $ 68 and $ 193 million 
(compared to $ 162 and $ 192 million for the rigid fleet 
architecture). 
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 Figure 3 shows that flexible fleet architecture I offers 
a huge improvement in economic value over that of the 
rigid fleet architecture with an increase in the E(NPV) of 
almost 92% corresponding to a flexibility value of $ 45.86 
million. Flexible fleet architecture I offers this large 
increase in fleet value via risk minimization rather than 
revenue maximization. This becomes clear by comparing 
the CDFs’ lower end tails, which represent maximum 
possible losses, and CDFs’ upper end tails, which represent 
maximum possible gains. The maximum possible gain that 
flexible fleet architecture I could obtain is nearly the same 
as that of the rigid architecture; however, the maximum 
possible loss flexible fleet architecture I could incur is 
limited to only 41% of the maximum possible loss that the 
rigid architecture could incur. Fleet architecture I offers 
risk minimization through its low fixed cost, whose present 
value is only 70% of that of the rigid architecture. 
6.3 Valuation of the Flexible Fleet Architecture II 
 Flexible fleet architecture II comprises two small 
spacecraft, each of which operates 30 active transponders 
and can serve either coverage area at a time. The two small 
spacecraft are deployed at the beginning of the first stage. 
This configuration is inspired by a relatively new trend in 
the commercial communication satellite industry towards 
acquisition of small to medium size spacecraft. Because the 
fleet is flexible, at any of the four stages, depending upon 
how demand materializes, the two spacecraft may need to 
be co-located in a single orbital spot to serve the same 
coverage area. Operating two spacecraft in one orbital 
location complicates the operational processes, which 
increases the operating cost. 
 The E(NPV) of flexible fleet architecture II is $ 56.20 
million (compared to $ 49.94 million for the rigid 
architecture) with a standard deviation of $ 3.74 million 
(compared to $ 3.96 million for the rigid architecture). The 
maximum possible loss and gain for flexible fleet 
architecture II is $ 131 and $ 142 million respectively 
(compared to a maximum possible loss and gain of $ 162 
or $ 192 million for the rigid fleet architecture). The 
economic value of flexible fleet architecture II is close to 
that of the rigid architecture. Although flexible fleet 
architecture II decreases the maximum possible loss of the 
rigid architecture by $ 31 million, it also decreases the 
maximum possible gain by $ 50 million. Therefore, the 
advantage of cutting maximum losses is partially reduced 
by the disadvantage of decreasing the maximum possible 
gain. Additionally, the value that the flexibility of the 
architecture offers is only $ 6.26 million. However, the true 
advantage of flexible fleet architecture II over the rigid 
fleet architecture is that flexible fleet architecture II 
requires a total fixed cost of $ 341 million (paid upfront at 
the beginning of the first stage), only 87% of the present 
value of the total fixed cost required for the rigid fleet 
architecture. 
6.4 Valuation of Flexible Fleet Architecture III 
 Flexible fleet architecture III has two small flexible 
spacecraft similar to flexible fleet architecture II. However, 
it deploys S/C II at the beginning of the second stage, 
whereas in flexible fleet architecture II, both spacecraft are 
deployed at the beginning of the first stage.  This 
architecture is studied to investigate the effect of 
sequencing, which is considered one of the flexibility 
levers, on the financial performance of a fleet. The 
advantage of a delayed deployment of S/C II decreases the 
present value of its cost and the upfront investment. 
However, having only one spacecraft in stage one 
eliminates the fleet’s ability to capture large amount of 
revenue from CA-I early on. 
 The E(NPV) of flexible fleet architecture III is $ 
19.40 million (compared to $ 49.94 million for the rigid 
architecture) with a standard deviation of $ 1.63 million 
(compared to $ 3.96 million for the rigid architecture). The 
maximum possible loss and gain for flexible fleet 
architecture III are $ 86 and $ 73 million respectively 
(compared to $ 162 and $ 192 million respectively for the 
rigid fleet architecture). The only advantage that flexible 
fleet architecture III offers is that its NPV distribution has a 
small standard deviation and a tight NPV range. The NPV 
range for flexible fleet architecture III is only 45% of that 
of the rigid architecture and is 58% of that of flexible fleet 
architecture II. This small spread might be preferred by a 
conservative satellite operator willing to sacrifice possible 
large gains in order to significantly minimize risk. In other 
words, the “value of flexibility” is now negative. The cost 
of flexibility for flexible fleet architecture III is $ 33.55 
million. This cost could be considered as an insurance 
premium that a risk averse satellite operator might be 
willing to pay. 
7 Conclusions 
 The case study presented in this paper shows how the 
value-at-risk analysis can calculate the value of flexibility 
as regards increases in expected net present value and 
changes in maximum capital investment and losses. This 
approach to Real Options provides a simple, but powerful, 
economic framework that allows for the valuation of 
flexibility in complex systems using a discounted cash flow 
approach that is well known to engineers, project mangers, 
and strategic decision makers. 
 The suggested value-at-risk analysis was applied to 
the architecting of commercial communication satellite 
fleets. The fleet architecting framework integrates 
economic valuation with spacecraft technical design to 
maximize the financial value of a fleet under uncertain, 
dynamic market conditions. A sample case study is 
presented where the demand evolution in two 
geographically disconnected markets is considered 
simultaneously over a 20 year time span. The forecast 
demand models show that while the demand is at a peak in 
one market and is rapidly vanishing, the demand in the 
other market is nonexistent at present but quickly picks up 
and reaches a peak towards the end of the time window of 
the problem.  
 The fleet architecting framework comprises an 
economic and a technical domain. The economic domain 
includes uncertain, dynamic demand models, parametric 
cost and revenue models, and the value-at-risk Real 
Options valuation. The technical domain includes a 
spacecraft sizing model and a spacecraft reliability 
estimation model that are coupled with a Genetic 
Algorithm to generate optimal spacecraft designs. The 
inputs to the technical domain are payload requirements 
and flexibility requirements that are generated and passed 
down from the economic domain based on forecast 
demand. 
 Four fleet configurations along with their optimal 
spacecraft designs were generated. One configuration is a 
traditional, rigid fleet architecture where each spacecraft is 
tuned to serve only one geographical market. Four 
flexibility levers are combined at different levels to 
generate three flexible fleet architectures. The first lever is 
flexible payload design that allows a spacecraft to serve 
either market at a time. The second and third levers are the 
number of spacecraft in a fleet and the size of the payload 
on each spacecraft. The fourth flexibility lever is the 
sequencing or deployment plan of the spacecraft over the 
20 year period under consideration. The value-at-risk 
analysis proves that flexible fleet architectures provide 
significant economic value over that of the rigid fleet 
architecture. 
 Readers interested in Real Options should appreciate 
that the value-at-risk analysis provides much more 
information than a conventional Real Options analysis that 
only calculates the value of flexibility. As the results and 
discussion show, the value-at-risk analysis generates a 
range of information that may be useful to decision makers. 
 Designers should carefully note that the architectures 
that maximize the value of the system are often far 
different from those that maximize narrow technical 
efficiency. Indeed, in this case study, the rigid architecture 
that maximizes technical efficiency provides the most risky 
system of far lower expected net present value than flexible 
architecture alternatives. 
 We believe that the power of the suggested “Real 
Options in the system” analysis lies in its ability to 
empower engineers to find approaches that embed 
flexibility in complex systems and observe the value of 
flexibility using value-at-risk distributions. Being able to 
perform this simple economic analysis will allow engineers 
to change their designs to manipulate the value-at-risk 
distributions in ways that are favorable to the stakeholders 
of the systems. 
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